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Linguistics should make significant contributions to literary and critical the-
ory, but has failed to do so. This paper investigates the reasons for the failure
and suggests an approach based in Relevance Theory for a working relation-
ship between literary studies and pragmatics. Literary critics have misappro-
priated linguistic terminology and theories, because their model of language
is outdated, and because they blur the distinction between scientific theo-
ries and interpretive frameworks—contexts in which assumptions are highly
salient. Following an outline of Relevance Theory, an application of rele-
vance stylistics demonstrates the distinctions between theories and interpre-
tive frameworks, and how they can reinforce one another.
La linguistique devrait apporter une contribution significative aux théories lit-
téraires et critiques, or cela ne s’est pas toujours produit. Cet article examine
les causes d’un tel échec et suggère une approche fondée sur la théorie de
la pertinence (« Relevance Theory ») pour rendre compte des relations entre
études littéraires et pragmatiques. Les critiques littéraires ont mal employé
la terminologie des théories linguistiques car ils se réfèrent à un modèle de
langue démodé, et ils ne distinguent pas entre les théories scientifiques et
les cadres interprétatifs—contextes dans lesquels les ensembles de supposi-
tions sont fortement saillants. Après un résumé de la théorie de la pertinence,
on présente une application stylistique de cette théorie à l’interprétation d’un
poéme afin d’illustrer la distinction entre les théories et les cadres interpréta-
tifs, ainsi que leur renforcement mutuel.
Introduction
Though both linguistics and literary theory deal with language, they do so at
different ends of production, so to speak. We might expect that there would be
a fruitful working relationship between them, but every hopeful beginning has
ended in ruin. And yet there remains the deep conviction, particularly on the
part of linguists who work in literary studies (such as Fabb, 2002, 2004), that
failure is not inevitable, that a way can be found to draw these two disciplines,
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so intimately concernedwith language, together in a mutually reinforcing fash-
ion. Linguistic stylistics has brought linguistics into the realm of the analysis
and interpretation of literature, through work by Leech (1969), Leech and
Short (1981) and Short (1989). Recent research, however, is moving towards
cognitive stylistics (Culpeper and Semino, 2002). Literary linguistics is still
regarded as secondary, parasitic or superfluous. Indeed, a renowned and re-
spected theorist, such as Roland Barthes, seriously (or at least half-seriously)
could propose that:
. . . those who carry on literary analysis must sometimes demand a linguis-
tics which does not exist. It is their role to determine, to a certain degree,
the need for a linguistics which does not exist. . . . Literary analysis will
need a change in linguistics. I insist on this kind of methodological re-
lationship; literary semiotics cannot be considered as simply a follower
and a parasite of linguistics. (Roland Barthes, reply to “Linguistics and
Poetics”, Macksey and Donato, 1970, pp. 316–317)
In this paper, linguistics refers broadly to generative linguistics as devel-
oped by Chomsky. It is the theoretical model generally accepted by Relevance
Theory, the approach adopted in this paper. In their “Reply to Rajagopalan”,
Wilson and Sperber (2005) remark that “We are among the few pragmatists
who have been directly influenced by Chomsky’s overall view of language and
cognition, but Relevance Theory is not the working out of some non-existent
Chomskyan programme for pragmatics, nor is it intrinsically committed to any
particular view of grammar” (p. 100). Researchers who apply Relevance The-
ory to the interpretation and analysis of literature do so from the standpoint of
a model of language accepted by most linguists.
Linguistics has long been ransacked by critics and theorists of literature:
Saussure’s phonological descriptions became binary oppositions (Fogarty,
2005) in structuralism and post-structuralism.1 Transformational grammar sur-
faced as the narratological claim that innate or cultural structures generate
narratives.2 Despite the optimism of the 1958 Conference on Style in Indi-
ana, where participants looked forward to cross-disciplinary work “between
literary criticism, linguistics, psychology, and cultural anthropology” (Durant
and Fabb, 1990, p. 36), the history of the twentieth century with respect to this
partnership has been marked by utter failure.
The problem, according to many literary critics, is with linguistics. But
if we look at the question which critics expected linguistics would answer, it
becomes clear that the real difficulty is a category error. Literary and critical
theorists did not ask How can linguistics shed light on the structures and inter-
pretation of texts? but rather How can linguistics produce fresh new readings
of literary texts? At first blush, the question is not obviously misconceived.
However, this criterion— the production of fresh readings—will not work
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for sociolinguistics or pragmatics any more than it will for phonology. Yet it
was precisely this standard which literary theorists applied to the contributions
of linguistics. Indeed, this criterion is the one which relevance stylistics—
the approach advocated in this paper— is supposed to have failed to meet.
MacMahon (1999, p. 56) writes that “Toolan berates relevance theory for not
helping us to decide on Salman Rushdie’s intentions in Satanic Verses or to
‘adjudicate between interpretations’ ” generally. This sounds worryingly like
Green’s (1997) implication that Relevance Theory should produce new and
interesting readings of literary texts. Neither function was ever intended for
Relevance Theory. When linguistics failed to provide new interpretations, lit-
erary theorists felt justified in criticising the linguistic model, or in dismissing
the possibility of cross-disciplinary work.3
As I will argue in this paper, such a question represents a grave error
arising out of a misunderstanding of the nature and role of theory in the sci-
ences, and the appropriation of extra-disciplinary terms and frameworks by
literary studies. We can establish the basis for a productive relationship be-
tween linguistics and literary studies by re-examining the linguistic model
which motivates literary theories about the text, and the content of the term
theory in literary studies.
Kinds of theory
Linguistic theories are scientific theories. Literary theories are not. Indeed, as
Durant and Fabb (1990, p. 182) point out, a theory can be “not strictly true”
and still be useful. Scientific theories must meet criteria of falsifiability and
reproducibility; literary and critical theories typically must meet second-order
criteria of productivity, parsimony and exhaustivity.4 Such second-order cri-
teria are among the tests used to distinguish among theories in the sciences
generally.5 Furlong (1996, 2002) proposed variations of these principles as cri-
teria by which to evaluate literary or non-spontaneous interpretation of texts.
These two kinds of theorising—scientific and interpretive—do not refer
to identical activities. Ultimately, the kinds of theories which are used in lit-
erary criticism (developed from semiological analysis or from critical theories
which are statements about the world) cannot explain the phenomenon of lit-
erary interpretation, partly because they rest on a flawed model of language,
and partly because they are not theories about language at all. The misuse of
the term theory in literary studies—applying not just to claims about liter-
ature, but to a range of critical theories drawn from a range of fields—has
led to a widely-held conviction among critics that what is called theoretical
work in literary and cultural studies amounts to “banal punditry and pseudo-
quantitative comparisons” occurring in “the spooky Bermuda triangle that lies
between Marx, Freud and Saussure” (Griffiths, 2003, p. 8). Knapp and Pence
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(2003) trace the history of “the death of theory” in their introduction to the first
of two special issues of Poetics Today (24.4, 25.1) that grapple with the state
of current critical theory, concluding that reports of the demise of theory, like
that of the author, may be premature.
I propose that by re-evaluating the model of language widely adopted
by literary studies, and by recognising the different values of descriptive and
interpretive theories in literary studies, we can discover the grounds for a
renewed partnership between biological-cognitive linguistics and literary stud-
ies. Specifically, Relevance Theory, developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson (1995), can be used as a methodological tool which will help produce
richer and stronger analyses of the kinds of interpretations which it is the busi-
ness of literary studies to provide. Relevance Theory can serve as a vehicle for
meta-critique, a systematic account of how a reader decides “what is meant”
by a text. Regardless of the cultural theory adopted, Relevance Theory supplies
an insight into the process of interpretation which allows readers and theorists
to argue fruitfully about their interpretations, and to understand the bases of
their conclusions.
Linguistics is a powerful tool in the interpretation of texts, though of itself
it does not generate new readings. Rather, linguistics in general and pragmat-
ics in particular provide a theoretical framework within which to describe and
explain interpretive behaviour through an account of the function and cons-
truction of context. It seems incontestable that a knowledge of linguistics is
indispensable for a deep understanding not only of the structure, but of the
effects of literary works. The linguistic account of the medium of language
does not exhaust its artistic possibilities; and though linguistics will not pro-
duce new readings of texts (unless they are texts about linguistics), it can add
profoundly to our experience and understanding of literature.
I begin by explaining the difficulties arising out of the choice of linguis-
tic model that literary theory has made. From there, I discuss the distinction
between scientific theory and interpretive frameworks (theories about litera-
ture). Following this discussion, I provide an overview of Relevance Theory,
and demonstrate how Relevance Theory deals with context in interpretation.
To demonstrate how Relevance Theory can be used in critical literary study, I
explicate a linguistic context for the interpretation of Dora Greenwell’s (1996)
poem Scherzo (see Appendix), focussing on its phonological features, and ar-
gue that this application of linguistics to interpretation reveals aspects of the
poem that significantly enrich our understanding of it. I conclude with some
remarks about the prospects for further application of Relevance Theory to
literary studies.
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Language and literature
There is a considerable body of literature issuing from theorists operating
within an applied linguistics framework who focus on, for example, the evi-
dence of ideology in texts6 and its effect on the interpretation of these texts.
This socio-pragmatics might have been assumed to have had a greater impact
on literary studies. However, the work of these writers is often highly technical
and thus inaccessible to the average student of literature with no background in
applied linguistics, pragmatics, or philosophy of language. Students can take
in their conclusions without understanding how they were arrived at. Conse-
quently, the student of literature is likely to confuse the term “theory” with
“hypothesis”, or to accede to the view of theory put forward by Eagleton (1983,
p. 197):
Any attempt to define literary theory in terms of a distinctive method is
doomed to failure. . . . [Its] methods have more in common with other
“disciplines”— linguistics, history, sociology and so on— than they have
with each other. Methodologically speaking, literary theory is a non-subject.
This was Eagleton’s position in 1983, in his Literary theory: An introduc-
tion. While literary and critical theories have developed considerably in the
twenty years since then, the assumptions about theory and about language that
underpin this statement have not substantially changed. Literary interpretations
that make use of the terms and approaches of other disciplines, such as psy-
chology, sociology or linguistics, are called theoretical. The approach called
postmodernism claims that any of these choices is as good as any other, and
that situational considerations will determine whether one subjects a text to a
feminist, postcolonial, structuralist or psychoanalytical reading. Lodge (2004)
refers to this behaviour as “a kind of hedonistic pick ’n mix browsing in the
cultural shoppingmall of ideas and experiences, depriving even ostensibly pro-
gressive projects like postcolonialism of practical effect and moral purpose”
(p. 40). Contemporary theoretical practice thus takes Eagleton’s description to
its logical conclusion: there is no literature, only texts; there is no theory, only
methods.
When literary studies assimilates theoretical structureswithout understand-
ing the discipline in which these theories operate, the result sheds less light
on the work than on the reader. Furthermore, for all their theoretical appara-
tus, these readings do not and cannot explain literary interpretation. Literary
studies, being concerned with texts which are written out of and about human
experience, can legitimately make use of a wide range of critical theories and
interpretive strategies; but it must also be cognizant of the nature and limita-
tions of critical theory, and of the flaws of a semiological-functionalist model
of language.
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Models of language
It might seem quixotic to attempt to bring together two such different ways of
seeing the world as literary theory and linguistics. Scientists value systematic-
ity, prediction, fact and reproducibility. Humanists value intuition, insight and
uniqueness. And while those working in the humanities fear the reductivism of
science, social scientists are appalled by the anarchic individualism of belle-
lettrists. Yet literary studies in the twentieth century and the development of
critical theory in literary studies grew out of, the deep desire among literary
critics to bring the clarity of the scientific enterprise to the disarray of literary
studies. This project tapped into, and in some measure grew out, of a tradition
in literary criticism that united the rigour of analysis (often indebted to phi-
losophy) with the insights of the creative imagination. Eagleton describes the
belief that informed Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism, “that criticism was in a sorry
unscientific mess and needed to be smartly tidied up. It was a matter of subjec-
tive value judgements and idle gossip, and badly required the discipline of an
objective system” (1983, p. 91). Frye contended that “literature itself formed
such a system” (p. 91), but this “liberal humanist tradition” was still mired in
the belief of the worth of certain values— rightly characterised by Eagleton as
“middle-class liberal values” (p. 94)—as expressed in literary texts. The in-
escapable conclusion was that, if literary studies was incapable of putting the
study of literary texts on a systematic basis, then that system had to be sought
in the social and physical sciences.
The most likely place to begin, especially during the early decades of
the twentieth century, was linguistics, then evolving out of nineteenth-century
philology. The model of language developed during that period was rooted
in the semiology of Saussure, and led to swift developments in phonology.
The Saussurean model was also the basis, ultimately, for literary structural-
ism and post-structuralism. Its vestiges can still be seen in aspects of Lacanian
psychoanalytic criticism, deconstruction and various cultural theories. The as-
sumption that every element in a system implies the existence of a contrastive
element derives from a semiological view of systems as being constructed
around oppositional units. So, for example, Lacanian criticism may argue that
human beings exist within a “reality” constructed by language and marked
by successive senses of loss or exclusion. This reality, being linguistic, con-
sists of terms and notions defined by their opposite. Deconstructive criticism
may claim that terms get their values only by their difference from other terms
(see Durant and Fabb, 1990, pp. 31–46). And postcolonialism may focus ex-
clusively on the ways in which hegemonic groups dominate by excluding (or
silencing) powerless groups; here, too, an unstated but fundamental opposition
defines the system.
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Jonathan Culler, writing in 1975, when this trend was peaking, explicitly
tied structuralism to linguistics:
Indeed the relations that are the most important in structural analysis are
the simplest: binary oppositions. Whatever else the linguistic model may
have done, it has undoubtedly encouraged structuralists to think in binary
terms, to look for functional oppositions in whatever material they are
studying. (1975, p. 14)
Stephen Bonnycastle (1996), in his discussion of narratology, describes its “fo-
cus on general (and perhaps universal) patterns in the structure of plots”, and
refers to Greimas’ system, in which “narratives contain six roles that form
three pairs”, arranged as opposites: subject and object, sender and receiver,
helper and opponent (p. 159). But the practice did not begin in the 1960s; Rus-
sian Formalism took shape at precisely the time when Saussure’s students were
gathering the notes that would become the General Course, and took “the sci-
entific study of literature” as its aim (Fokkema and Ibsch, 1978, p. 11). Indeed,
the development of much literary and critical theory at the time was driven by
the conviction that literary studies could and should be rationalised by project-
ing them onto the framework provided by the scientific study of the medium
of literature.
All these critical theories are intellectually indebted to a semiological-
functionalist model of language. The semiological model was challenged by
Chomsky (1965), and while the Chomskyan model of language transformed
the practices and theories of linguistics over the next half-century—even of
those linguists who rejected it— it was neither understood nor adopted by
literary theorists. Instead, most literary theories continue to assume that the
semiological model of language and the code model of communication are ac-
curate, current and valid. Since this is not the case, literary studies has been
unable to incorporate current research in linguistics in any meaningful, consis-
tent way for nearly forty years.
It hasn’t been for lack of trying. However, each attempt has ended in
failure because literary theorists have not understood the difference between
scientific theories and interpretive theories— that is, between “a hypothesis
. . . held as an explanation of a group of facts or phenomena and how they
are caused which also makes predictions about cases” not already examined,
and a “system of interconnecting ideas or statements held as an explanation
or account of a group of phenomena” (Durant and Fabb, 1990, p. 174). The
key distinction between them is that the former, to be considered a scientific
theory, must undergo tests of falsifiability and reproducibility.
Linguistics has not been the only science or social science pillaged by
critical theorists; theoretical physics, psychoanalysis and economics have all
taken their turn. But the peculiar and enduring attraction of linguistics lay in
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the fact that it is the only discipline to deal exclusively with the very stuff of
literature: language. Consequently, linguistics has fared especially badly and
all critical theories based on the linguistic model have distorted what they have
appropriated. Not surprisingly, every critical theory based on linguistics has
been discredited. It is not obvious, however, that failure is thus inevitable.
Part of the problem is that we are dealing with two very different concepts
of the term theory. In the sciences, a theory is an explanatory model; in literary
studies, it is an interpretive framework. The distinction between these is not
superficial, and conflating them has proved fatal to virtually all attempts to
use the processes, discoveries, methods and approaches of linguistics to the
analysis of literature.
Explanatory models and interpretive frameworks
To make it easier to distinguish between these two kinds of theory, I propose to
reserve the term theory in this paper for scientific theories, which are falsifiable
and whose output is reproducible. For theory within the discipline of literary
studies, I propose the term interpretive framework.
An interpretive framework is a cohesive set of assumptions about the
world; it makes certain aspects of the text highly salient by restricting the con-
text in which it is processed. So long as readers accept the assumptions in this
context as true or probably true, they will regard the interpretations that re-
sult as fruitful or interesting. If the assumptions of the framework are rejected
(“the earth is flat”), then readers will reject the reading because it conflicts with
their understanding of the world. Interpretive frameworks thus produce read-
ings that validate or verify the claims of that framework, as well as illuminating
the text itself. While interpretive frameworks may draw attention to the core
set of assumptions that comprise the framework, they are also self-reinforcing
and culturally specific.
So, for instance, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, resting as it does on
claims about the world (i.e., an account of the development of the human psy-
che), is an interpretive framework. It makes manifest a set of assumptions in a
given text; these are derived from a context in which the premise that there is
no direct apprehension of reality outside language is so strongly manifest that
it is a factor in the interpretation of each section of text. Feminist theory rests
on claims about the relationship between women, men and power. A feminist
reading of a text will produce a reading in which observations about the rela-
tionships between men and women, and the power dynamics in a relationship
or a society, will be so strongly manifest as to affect every part of the reading.
Thus, a feminist reading of Dickens’ Great Expectations may point out
that Estella and Miss Haversham are not only mirror images of one another,
but are also projections of mid-Victorian anxieties about female sexuality and
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independence. This reading allows us to look at the novel not just as a classic
Bildungsroman, tracing the development of the male protagonist, but also as
an exploration of the failure of the feminine to sustain spiritual development in
an independent position. Dickens’ novel is crucially concerned with the moral
and spiritual independence of Pip, the central character; therefore, Estella’s
(and Miss Haversham’s, and Biddy’s) failure to become whole human beings
may suggest that women who step out of their “proper place” cannot attain
maturity, because they have abandoned their fundamental role as nurturers and
supporters of male growth. Such a reading follows naturally from some of the
basic assumptions of feminist theory.
However, we should note that such readings also provide evidence in sup-
port of the theories which generated them. A critic operating within the set
of assumptions about the world which feminist and gender theory accepts and
makes salient can now use the interpretation he produced to argue for the use-
fulness and validity of the theory he has used.7 He can use the interpretation
of Great Expectationswhich a feminist reading has produced in order to argue
that, indeed, nineteenth-century culture in general and Dickens in particular
acted on assumptions about women and gender that maintained structures of
oppression. Interpretive frameworks may thus draw attention to the core set of
assumptions that comprise the literary work, but they are self -reinforcing and
culturally specific. The tautological nature of this relationship differs funda-
mentally from the process underlying the testing of hypotheses or explanatory
theories, where models are confirmed or disconfirmed using evidence that has
not been generated by the model or theory in question.8
There is a second kind of interpretive framework: these are theories about
language itself, and they include those theories which most explicitly attempt to
incorporate the terms, methods, models and approaches of linguistics. Barthes’
S/Z (1974), for example, is as close as anyone has ever come to a thorough,
faithful, sustained structuralist reading outside a dissertation or an asylum, and
it is both too much and too little. Barthes is a clever, responsive reader, and he
shows how the style of the text both conveys the story of a sculptor (Sarrazine)
deceived by a castrato (Zambinella), and insinuates the sexual uncertainty that
lies at the heart of the story. Here, as in other interpretations produced by (non-
linguistic) theories about language, the reading becomes less about whatever it
was the writer wanted to communicate, and more about the theory’s assump-
tions about language and interpretation.While most readers who perseverewill
agree that the interpretive framework or critical theory Barthes creates from
the precepts of structuralism produces a consistent reading, they will also feel
that it’s somehow all “beside the point”. Since Balzac didn’t write Sarrazine
as a model for structuralist analysis, this impression is hardly surprising. Fur-
thermore, Barthes’ assumptions about the phenomenon of language and the
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discipline of linguistics turned out to be false, and so his interpretive frame-
work has fallen out of favour, because it is not productive.
Every interpretive framework based on theories of language—especially
linguistic theories—has failed. The “intellectual bankruptcy” of these ap-
proaches (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 7) reflects the fact that the domain of
linguistics has not been understood or respected by many of the critical theo-
rists who have adopted the procedures, terminology and models of linguistics.
The sole criterion that does not pertain to the linguistic analysis of literary
texts— the production of fresh readings—was precisely the one which liter-
ary theorists applied to the contributions of linguistics.
The development of pragmatics offered the promise of a more fruitful the-
oretical relationship between linguistics and literature. Pragmatics, dealing as
it does with the interpretation of texts, ought to provide a theoretical framework
that will supply literary and critical theorists with interesting insights into the
texts and their interpretations. But this hasn’t happened; pragmatic readings of
literary texts have turned out to be as unproductive as those of previous appli-
cations of linguistics. Some critics have therefore suggested that literary works
cannot be served by linguistics, that literary works are resistant to linguistics
and to pragma-stylistics (Green, 1997, p. 136).
The confusion arises out of the nature of interpretive frameworks. These,
like pragmatics, are ultimately concerned with questions of context. But be-
cause, as we have seen, interpretive frameworks are under no obligation to
examine the context they make salient, but instead generate the evidence which
supports their claims about the world, they cannot illuminate the role of con-
text in interpretation. What is needed is a way to bring the insights of critical
theory—which are, in the end, insights about the context in which a work
is produced, or read—within an explanatory model of the way that context
operates in interpretation. I propose to apply Relevance Theory in order to
demonstrate how linguistics and literary studies can benefit from one another.
Relevance Theory is centrally concerned with the role of context in which
interpretations are made, and so allows for a productive relationship between
literary studies and linguistics. While Relevance Theory will never in itself
generate a new reading of a literary work—because linguistics is not about the
world, but about language— it can shed light on the process of reading, on the
criteria for interpretation and on the role of intention in literature. Relevance
Theory provides a description of interpretive frameworks that is principled and
motivated, and consistent with the programme of linguistics.
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Relevance Theory: An overview
When a student claims that Housman’s poem To An Athlete, Dying Young is
about an old man looking back on the glories of his youth, we reject his read-
ing. The fact that we make this judgment indicates that we recognise the writer
is trying to convey some meaning, and that we have a criterion for deciding
what it is. Relevance Theory is a theory about this criterion, and an explana-
tory hypothesis about the nature, use and workings of context; it derives from
a small set of fundamental assumptions about cognition and communication.
Every utterance has a variety of possible interpretations, all compatible
with the information that is linguistically encoded. However, not all of these
occur to the reader simultaneously, for some take more effort to think up than
others. Readers are equipped with a single, general, exceptionless criterion for
evaluating interpretations as they occur. This criterion is powerful enough to
exclude all but at most a single interpretation, so that having found one that
satisfies it, the reader can stop, for there is never more than one. Perhaps no
aspect of Relevance Theory has been so misunderstood within literary and
critical studies as this last claim. To claim the uniqueness of an interpretation
at any given point for any given reader is not to assert that a text has a single,
unique meaning. Rather, since the interpretation of an utterance consists in fact
of a set of assumptions, an interpretation may be said to comprehend many
meanings held at varying degrees of strength or salience. All that is claimed
here is that the constitution of this set of assumptions is uniquely determined
at any given time by any given reader.
Relevance Theory claims that the writer produces a text (an utterance)
which provides evidence for the set of assumptions (propositional and non-
propositional— ideas, feelings, impressions and so forth) that she wants her
reader to recognise as having been intended by her. The reader may or may not
also accept these assumptions as true or probably true, and adjust his view of
the world accordingly. Even if this does not happen, however, communication
is by definition successful if the reader recognises the interpretation the writer
intended. Thus, in Relevance Theory, there is always an intending author, there
is always some responsibility on the reader’s part for the construction of the
interpretation, and there is always an intended interpretation. However, this
account raises the question of what the term “intended interpretation” means,
and how intention is connected with context.
The fundamental claim of Relevance Theory is that every aspect of com-
munication and cognition is governed by the search for relevance. Relevance
Theory makes a distinction between the relevance of a phenomenon, and the
relevance of an utterance. The criterion for evaluating hypotheses about the in-
terpretation of an utterance is the Second Principle of Relevance, which “states
that every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of
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its own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1995, p. 266). The First and
Second Principles of Relevance are spelled out in Sperber and Wilson (1995,
pp. 255–279).
Every utterance starts out as a bid for the reader’s attention, and so creates
an expectation of relevance. The criterion for evaluating hypotheses about the
utterance is built around this expectation. In communication, we have an ex-
pectation of relevance which is precise and powerful enough that if the reader
finds an interpretation that satisfies that expectation, he can be sure it is the
only one that will do so. This is not the same as claiming that it will always be
correct— i.e., one that the writer had in mind. The reader may overlook what
the writer thought would be obvious, or pick up on a hypothesis the writer had
overlooked. It is therefore crucial that the reader identify the context in which
the writer intended him to interpret her text.
Failure to correctly identify this context can lead to unacceptable inter-
pretations. The last line of Seamus Heaney’s poignant poem,Mid-term Break,
very strongly implies the age of the speaker’s brother, dead as the result of an
accident:
A four foot box [coffin], a foot for every year.
A student of mine arrived at the perfectly logical deduction that, had the child
been five, he would have been laid out in a five-foot box (etc.). Heaney likely
never foresaw this mischievous reading, which follows from the evidence of
the text, but whose grotesque comedy negates—and is certainly inconsistent
with— the pathos of the rest of the work. The student’s conclusion shows that
we have to distinguish between implication and implicature, and points out
that context construction is not unconstrained.
Implications and implicatures: Context in interpretation
The difference between treating the text as an object and treating it as a com-
municative act is central to the distinction between implications and implica-
tures. A tree, for instance, or sheet lightning, is a phenomenon. In the search
for relevance, an individual may process information about these things in a
context and work out the implications of that information. The presence of a
living tree strongly implies a supply of water; the appearance of sheet lightning
strongly implies that it’s high time to seek shelter. But none of these implica-
tions is in any way connected to communicative intentions on the part of the
tree, or the lightning: they are simply deductions that result from processing
the information in a context. There is no communicative act— the tree isn’t
trying to convey something by being there—only a phenomenon which the
human being processes in the general cognitive search for relevance.
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A text, however, is different: it is of course an object in the world, and
peoplemay derive implications from its existence— such as the presence of lit-
erary agents—but it is first of all a communicative act. Consequently, it gives
rise not just to implications but implicatures: implications which the reader
may assume, with varying degrees of confidence, as having been intended by
the writer to be recovered. Sperber and Wilson identify two kinds of contex-
tual implications: contextual premises and contextual conclusions. The first are
supplied by the reader in the construction of the intended context; the second
are the result of inferences carried out in that context. These conclusions con-
stitute the premises for the continued construction (or perhaps extension) of
the context (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995, pp. 108–117, 142–151).
Texts are therefore always intentional, and are not treated as objects in
the world, to be processed in a context entirely determined by the reader. (Of
course they can be so treated, but then, according to Relevance Theory, the
utterance is being treated as a phenomenon and not as communication.) The
text provides evidence not just for the interpretation, but for the context which
produces that interpretation.
This view of the function of context in the process of interpretation allows
us to describe interpretive frameworks—especially those that rest on claims
about the world, rather than claims about language or reading—within a prin-
cipled theoretical framework. In constructing the context in which a text is
read, the reader relies on the evidence explicitly provided by the text and by
a wide range of other resources. These may include other works by the same
author; the cultural and historical context in which the work was produced;
biographical information about the author; other readers’ interpretations; and
so on. Thus the context in which we read the work may be indefinitely ex-
panded. At the same time, it is also powerfully constrained. What acts as the
basis for these constraints? Relevance Theory proposes that the context, like
the interpretation, is intended by the communicator; the intended context is the
one which will yield the intended interpretation. The evidence for the intended
context is provided, like the evidence for the interpretation itself, by the writer
in the text.
Now, interpretive frameworks are concerned with explicating contexts,
and especially with making salient assumptions which have not been strongly
manifest in the past. These assumptions may have been very weakly mani-
fest— so weak, in fact, that they have never figured in the interpretation of
a text— for any number of reasons; or they may have been more manifest at
various times in the past, or to various groups of readers. So, for instance, the
contextual premises that are made strongly manifest by feminist theory, such
as the degree to which social structures and systems of thought have restricted
the ability of women to act autonomously or publicly, may have always been
obvious (i.e., highly manifest) to people sensitive to the connection between
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society and its individuals. Or, contextual premises about the novelty of re-
publican governments may have been more salient in the past, or in particular
cultures— say, during the Golden Century in Holland—and have faded from
general awareness since then. Finally, assumptions about the cosmos—such
as that the sun, moon and stars revolve around the earth—might have been
believed in the distant past, and disbelieved more recently.
In all these examples, critical theories act, not to produce readings of texts
that will refute these assumptions, but to yield interpretations resulting pre-
cisely from making the assumptions strongly manifest. They therefore enact
the kinds of cognitive activities described by Relevance Theory, and produce
precisely the sort of readings that Relevance Theory predicts. To that imme-
diate extent, then, Relevance Theory clearly can assist in the understanding of
the production of interpretations by critical theories. But as a theory of prag-
matics, grounded in linguistics, Relevance Theory can do far more: it allows
also, and perhaps uniquely, for the incorporation of linguistic observations and
models into the interpretation of texts and, crucially, helps account in part for
the connection between language and experience.
Linguistics, context and literature
I will put forward my case for a working relationship between linguistics and
literary studies within a relevance-theoretic framework by explicating a lin-
guistic context for the interpretation of a poem. I want to show how a context—
an interpretive framework— is constrained in part by the facts of the language
in which the text is written, facts which can be used to produce fresh readings
of a text, or to support or deepen existing readings. This is quite a different
matter than applying linguistics wholesale to the interpretation of texts; and
it differs again from using linguistic frameworks and models as the basis for
critical theories. I will not describe my reading in detail, but I want to show
how this approach might work.
Poetry differs from prose in important ways, some of which can be cap-
tured in linguistic representation.Where rhythmical andmetrical patterns exist,
linguistic description can make them salient in ways that traditional poetics
cannot. A working knowledge of phonology can uncover patterns of sound
which help produce the effect of those patterns. While not every poem will
yield sufficient results to make such an analysis worthwhile, the effort is well
worth it when it reveals sophisticated technical devices in apparently ordi-
nary works.
A context that highlights some linguistic elements of Dora Greenwell’s
A Scherzo can affect the implicatures we derive. The Scherzo is sub-titled A
Shy Person’s Wishes, and the conjunction of the title and sub-title might lead
the reader to infer that the poem is spoken by a shy person trapped at a social
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function which is causing her distress of some sort. Up to line 17, we learn
where she would like to be: with “the innermost heart of a peach”, a “darkest
summer pool”, “the chink of an aged tree”, a “chrysalis”. From this line to
line 27, however, these tiny, dark, secret places give way to “fire in the jagged
thunder-cloud”, “stones on some desolate highway”, a “torrid lair”. At line
28, with no punctuation to signal a shift, the first type of locale reappears—
a “quiet loom”— followed by the heartfelt desire to be “anywhere” but where
the speaker is now.
The dominant metre is anapestic tetrameter, a metre consisting of four
units, in each of which two unstressed syllables are followed by a stressed
syllable. The effect is of a brisk waltz time—appropriately enough, since a
scherzo is a dance in quick triple time—strengthening the impression that the
poem is set at a social occasion, such as a dance. However, a scherzo is also a
light-hearted piece— the term comes from an Italian word for joke—but this
poem is not light-hearted; instead, it expresses the pain of someone for whom
casual social occasions may be a positive torment. The title and the poem seem
to describe conflicting impressions of the speaker’s state of mind. A focus on
the rhyme suggests that both descriptions are accurate.
If we look at the vowels of the end-rhymes— ignoring the extrametrical
unstressed syllables at the end of lines 20–25—we notice that up to line 11,
they are all tense vowels, and none is a low vowel. All the back vowels are
followed by a lateral or voiced alveolar stop, shifting the sound to the front
of the mouth and closing it off. From lines 12 to 17, the end-rhymes continue
to incorporate tense vowels, but all occur in closed syllables (previously there
has been a mixture of closed and open syllables). Indeed, lines 15–16 end in
bilabial stops, which cut the sound off completely, particularly when, as in
all these lines, they occur at the end of a phrase, at the end of a line and in a
stressed syllable. Up to line 16, we have a series of syllables whose nuclei con-
sist of high front vowels (made with the mouth relatively closed), and whose
codas consist of voiced stops, none of which is made in the back of the mouth
(and therefore also made with the mouth relatively closed). At line 17, how-
ever, the poem undergoes a shift in imagery, and a corresponding shift in the
vowels of the end-rhymes.
From lines 17 to 27, all the vowels in the end-rhymes are rising diph-
thongs. Though none occurs in an open syllable, all produce a louder sound,
and take longer to articulate than any of the preceding end-rhymes. And since
the poem was written by a British speaker, a contemporary reader might not
have produced the /r/ at the end of lair and bear, making these open syllables
with diphthongs as their nuclei. The last two lines revert to the initial pattern,
and consist of a tense high vowel followed by a bilabial nasal—an action that
effectively shuts the speaker’s mouth completely.
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Application: Interpretation where a linguistic description is highly salient
This is a very rough description of what’s going on in a very small part of
the poem. Notice, though, how the sounds force the reader of the poem to
mimic the repression which the reader may conclude the speaker is struggling
with. The cumulative effects of the sounds suggest that “the shy person” of
the poem’s subtitle is not a docile, meek character. Someone who desires to
join the tulip in its bulb may well be feeling small and miserable, but someone
who wants to be with “things that are chainless, and tameless, and proud”
is more likely to be harbouring resentment at being trapped. Alternatively,
the speaker of the poem may herself identify with these “things”, thus ex-
pressing her bedrock sense of herself as not insignificant, but powerful and
potentially dangerous to those who are snubbing her, or relegating her to the
position of wallflower. Or yet again, the entire monologuemay be taking place
within someone who is neither overlooked or denigrated, but who finds the
entire social scene—which she has mastered—nevertheless unendurably tir-
ing. Several similar readings can be supported by the evidence of the poem,
and it is not necessary to decide among them, I suggest elsewhere (Furlong,
1996, 2002).
Given that the speaker is almost certainly female, and that the poem is
mid-Victorian (when women were severely repressed socially), we may go
on to imagine, regardless of which specific interpretation we adopt, that the
speaker’s fury is aimed at several targets: herself, for her shyness; her compan-
ions, for dragging her to this punishment; or the company, for simultaneously
exposing and neglecting her, and thereby making her feel inadequate. While
this conclusion leaps over the long chain of implicatures which contribute to
this impression, it seems well-motivated, and the process can be explicated
relatively easily.
In the context I have been developing—which includes not just linguistic
description, but also cultural and historical information— these sound patterns
support the conclusion that this is not a gentle, but rather a bitterly angry poem.
The tension in the mouth, the closure of the jaw, imitate the clenched expres-
sion of a person who is not saying what she feels, but who is (perhaps literally)
biting back what she thinks. As the poem continues, the speaker finds her-
self breaking out, giving voice—almost literally— to yowls of anguish and
annoyance. The last two lines, with their reversion to tense vowels, and with
their bilabial stops, suggest that she may have been noticed, and has retreated
to her usual persona. They could almost be muttered, sotto voce, as she blends
into the background once more.
A phonetic description, and a knowledge of English phonology, thus re-
inforce one reading of the poem, and demonstrate that evidence of the context
in which the poem should be read can be found even at the level of sound and
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rhythm. That this pattern of end-rhymes isn’t requisite in English poetry—
and therefore can be regarded as highly salient in this work— is confirmed by
comparing it with another poem where structural elements contribute to the in-
terpretation, such as, say, Tichborne’s (1983) Elegy. Here the rhyme scheme is
interesting, but far less so than the highly salient repetition of phrase and sen-
tence structure, both within lines and within stanzas. This raises the possibility
that other linguistic phenomena—such as phrase structures—can contribute
to the context in which the whole text is read.
From a relevance-theoretic perspective, what has happened is that the poet
has provided evidence for the interpretation which she intends her reader to
recognise and entertain. Clearly, the linguistic evidence can be enriched to fully
formed propositions which convey the major ideas of the poem. These propo-
sitions are the output of considerable inferential processing, if only because
there is not a single independent clause in the entire piece. Every prepositional
phrase or non-finite verb phrase designates a place (or a condition); none con-
stitutes a sentence on its own. Hence, even the explicature “I wish I were with
the wasp at the innermost heart of a peach” represents the endpoint of a com-
plex sequence of inferences and enrichments.
However, it is the final phrase—“anywhere, anywhere, out of this room!”—
which allows the reader to construct an interpretation in which the images and
metaphors of the preceding 28 lines convey the speaker’s desire to leave her
present situation, rather than, say, express the desire to set out on an explo-
ration of the natural world. With the evidence of this line, and the sub-title, the
reader can construct a context through readily accessible assumptions about
shy people, public occasions (such as dances) and easily imagined psycho-
logical states of mind. When the metaphors and images of the preceding 28
lines are processed in this context, a wide range of very weak implicatures
are generated or represented. These implicatures, or poetic effects,9 consist not
just of fully formed propositions with truth conditions, but an array of non-
propositional assumptions such as images, impressions, emotional states and
so on; these are relatively weak, and the reader does not necessarily ascribe
them definitely to the writer: that is, he does not assume that the writer in-
tended him to recognise and entertain precisely these implicatures.
The phonological features of the poem,which I have discussed very briefly,
constitute an interesting and perhaps different kind of evidence. It’s true that
the poet has carefully chosen these end-rhymes, and so we should pay atten-
tion to them: they are clearly ostensive acts. However, the effects of these on
the reader which I have sketched out were not likely to have been intended
to have been consciously entertained by the reader, if for no other reason that
the poet had no access to phonological and phonetic theory. Yet the imitative
nature of the sounds— the way they force the reader to mimic the facial and
vocal behaviour of a person suffering from seething frustration and crippling
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shyness—was very likely intentional; certainly, if they were not, their pres-
ence and effect are serendipitous at the very least. Of course, poets are sensitive
to the sounds of their language, and can exploit the phonetic and phonological
possibilities without having anything like a theory about them.
The sounds of the poem constitute evidence, alongside the propositional
content and the impressions produced by the images, metaphors, and other
loose uses of language, for the intended context which the reader should con-
struct. As the reader processes the poem in this context, a range of implicatures
is produced; when the interpretation satisfies the reader’s expectations of rel-
evance (always higher for ostensibly artistic uses of language), he will stop
processing the poem. The effects I have discussed above may not be con-
sciously recognised, but as long they are entertained (and so guide the reader to
a line of interpretation which the writer foresaw and intended), then they have
fulfilled their artistic function. More to the point, linguistics provides a tool for
the analysis of the rhyme scheme, and Relevance Theory provides a model of
interpretation which accounts for its effect on the reader.
The interpretation I have given of Greenwell’s poem rests on the assump-
tion that people’s behaviour is evidence for their state of mind, whether or not
they are conscious of their feelings or motives. The situation then becomes
more complex, and turns on the degree to which either the speaker or the poet
is aware of the impression the text produces. We might imagine that the writer
at least had something like this in mind; but we should be cautious.
For one thing, there is no evidence that poets have explicit and conscious
access to linguistic structures. Clearly, they are sensitive to these structures,
and may well exploit that sensitivity to create works whose linguistic proper-
ties amplify, reinforce, or comment on the content of the work. But as Sperber
and Wilson (1995, pp. 217–224) point out, there is no need to ascribe a con-
sciousness about linguistic form to the writer. Furthermore, there is always
an element of judgment involved: readers are capable of deciding whether a
writer has succeeded in her attempt to exploit linguistic or poetic form in order
to create poetic effects, and as we know, not every poem is a jewel. Finally,
even if both speaker and writer are unaware of the ways in which the speaker’s
behaviour may suggest a more complex personality, the interpretation is not
compromised. We evaluate interpretations for plausibility, exhaustiveness and
unity, and when our expectations of relevance are satisfied, the process ends.
Conclusion
I have elaborated the ways in which contextual effects figure in one reading
of Greenwell’s poem—especially when the context includes a knowledge of
phonology and English grammar. What I have not done is to prove beyond a
shadow of a doubt that this reading is the one which the writer intended, and
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which we should therefore choose. It may not be possible ever to produce such
a reading. Relevance Theory assumes that the reader is not aiming at an hy-
pothesis which is identical to that conceived by the writer— if only because
the writer herself does not consciously entertain all the possible implicatures of
her text. Instead, Relevance Theory claims that the writer provides her reader
with the evidence needed to construct the context which will yield an interpre-
tation which she intended, or at least foresaw.
Furthermore, I have used this interpretation to demonstrate that we can
use Relevance Theory to explicate the workings and nature of interpretive
frameworks. We can see why some (such as structuralism or post-modernism)
generally end up producing variations of the same interpretation, no matter
what text they are applied to. They, like all interpretive frameworks, make cer-
tain assumptions about the world highly salient. In these cases, however, the
assumptions concern the process of reading, or describe the nature of writing
and language. Since the scope of the salient context is not the content but rather
the vehicle of the text, and since the context makes salient the same small set
of premises about language, it will come as no surprise that the mass of such
interpretations are nearly identical. Because the interpretations reinforce the
framework, and because the framework is about interpretation, the readings
will be less about the specific texts under consideration, and more about the
process of reading.
Interpretive frameworks consist of assumptions about the world; and since
all literature is also about the world, then fruitful results can follow when these
two are brought together. Relevance Theory provides an account not just of
what interpretive frameworks are, but also of what they do, and why they are
important. It also suggests a way in which we can bring together linguistics
and literary studies. I want therefore to conclude with a modest proposal, in
answer to Barthes’ suggestion (Macksey and Donato, 1970, p. 316):
Linguistics should demand a literary theory which does not exist; the role
of linguistics may be to determine, to a certain degree, the need for a liter-
ary studies which does not exist. Literary studies needs useful descriptions
of the components of the text, and a rational, motivated concept of con-
text. Linguistics can provide both, thus alleviating the poverty of literary
studies. I profess in the sincerity of my heart that I have not the least per-
sonal interest in endeavouring to promote this necessary work, having no
other motive than the public good, by relieving the critic, and giving some
pleasure to the student of literature.10
Notes
A version of this paper was first presented to the 26th Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces
Linguistics Association, Memorial University, St. John’s, Newfoundland, on November 8, 2002.
For the Greenwell poem I am indebted to my student, Mélanie Morin, whose essay “A Scherzo
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for an Animated Shy Poet” introduced me to the poem and its possibilities. For thoughtful and
rigorous comments which significantly improved the manuscript, I am grateful to an anonymous
reviewer who took a great deal of trouble over an earlier draft.
1 “Structuralism notes that much of our imaginative world is structured of, and struc-
tured by, binary oppositions (being/nothingness, hot/cold, culture/nature . . . )” (Lye,
1996).
2 “[T]he structuralist use of linguistic terms (‘morphology’, ‘grammar’, etc.) as meta-
phors for narrative structure” are “far removed from the way that linguists actually
use these terms in their own discipline” (Emmott, 2003, p. 228).
3 Jackson (2003) discusses applying the criteria of scientific theorising to the output
of interpretive practices.
4 Scholars introducing new ideas accept at least these standards, implicitly contrasting
the output of their interpretive frameworks with the products of previous theories or
approaches.
5 The Minimalist program stresses, e.g., parsimony.
6 Linguists and philosophers interested in gender and language, such as Butler (1992),
Coates (1993) and Schiffrin (1994), focus on uncovering the dynamics of gendered
relations through discourse analysis. The same has been done for race, imperialism,
social class and so forth.
7 Following the conventions established in pragmatic literature, I refer to the commu-
nicator as she and the hearer or reader as he.
8 Knapp and Pence (2003) remark that the “interpretive insights that guide scholarship
. . . often produce the insights putatively found in the objects studied” (p. 651).
9 For a detailed discussion of poetic effects, see Sperber and Wilson (1995, pp. 217–
224) and Pilkington (2000).
10 “I profess, in the sincerity of my heart, that I have not the least personal interest
in endeavouring to promote this necessary work, having no other motive than the
public good of my country, by advancing our trade, providing for infants, relieving
the poor, and giving some pleasure to the rich”, Jonathan Swift (A Modest Proposal,
2000; originally published in 1729).
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Appendix:
A Scherzo (A Shy Person’s Wishes)
Dora Greenwell
With the wasp at the innermost heart of a peach,
On a sunny wall out of tip-toe reach,
With the trout in the darkest summer pool,
With the fern-seed clinging behind its cool
Smooth frond, in the chink of an aged tree,
In the woodbine’s horn with the drunken bee,
With the mouse in its nest in a furrow old,
With the chrysalis wrapt in its gauzy fold;
With things that are hidden, and safe, and bold,
With things that are timid, and shy, and free,
Wishing to be;
With the nut in its shell, with the seed in its pod,
With the corn as it sprouts in the kindly clod,
Far down where the secret of beauty shows
In the bulb of the tulip, before it blows;
With things that are rooted, and firm, and deep,
Quiet to lie, and wishing to sleep;
With things that are chainless, and tameless, and proud,
With the fire in the jagged thunder-cloud,
With the wind in its sleep, with the wind in its waking,
With the drops that go to the rainbow’s making,
Wishing to be with the light leaves shaking,
Or stones on some desolate highway breaking;
Far up on the hills, where no foot surprises
The dew as it falls, or the dust as it rises;
To be couched with the beast in its torrid lair,
Or drifting on ice with the polar bear,
With the weaver at work in his quiet loom;
Anywhere, anywhere, out of this room!
(1867)
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